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Abstract—In this paper, we propose a passivity-based method-
ology for analysis and design of reinforcement learning in
multi-agent finite games. Starting from a known exponentially-
discounted reinforcement learning scheme, we show that con-
vergence to a Nash distribution can be shown in the class
of games characterized by the monotonicity property of their
(negative) payoff. We further exploit passivity to propose a class
of higher-order schemes that preserve convergence properties,
can improve the speed of convergence and can even converge in
cases whereby their first-order counterpart fail to converge. We
demonstrate these properties through numerical simulations for
several representative games.
I. INTRODUCTION
In multi-agent reinforcement learning in games, an agent
repeatedly adjusts his strategy in response to a stream of
payoffs which are in turn dependent on the actions of the other
agents. The objective is for agents to arrive at a strategy profile
that yields the best obtainable outcome for each of them, under
information-constraints or in the presence of noise. Whether
such an action profile can be reached depends on the learning
process used by the collection of these agents. Learning in
finite games typically involves discrete-time stochastic pro-
cesses, where stochasticity arises from the agents’ randomized
choices, [1]–[7]. A key approach to analyzing such processes
is based on the ordinary differential equation (ODE) method
of stochastic approximation, a method which relates their
behaviour to that of a “mean field” ODE, [8]. Motivated by
this, we follow [5], [9], [10], [12] and consider a reinforcement
learning scheme directly in continuous-time. By so doing, we
are able to focus on the relationship between reinforcement
learning, convex analysis, and passivity. 1
Our starting point is a variant of the continuous-time
exponentially-discounted learning (EXP-D-RL) in [5], ver-
sions of which are also known as the exponential-weight
algorithm [12], or Q-learning, [3], [6]. Under this continuous-
time learning process, each agent maintains a vector of scores
for all his actions, based on aggregation of his exponentially-
discounted stream of payoffs. These scores are then converted
into mixed strategies using a static logit (soft-max) rule which
assigns choice probabilities proportionally to the exponential
of each action’s score. The resulting learning dynamics de-
scribes the evolution of the scores (dual variables), rather than
of the mixed strategies (primal variables). The same score
dynamics results also from stochastic-approximation of a Q-
learning scheme, which was shown in [3] to converge to a
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1One could use the results developed in this paper to analyze discrete-time
learning schemes as in [3], [5], but we leave this for future work.
Nash distribution (logit equilibria) in 2-player zero-sum and
partnership (potential) games. It is also related to the scheme
proposed in [6] for traffic games in a repeated-game setup
and shown to converge to a Nash distribution in N -player
potential games. The strategy dynamics induced by this score
dynamics is analyzed in [5] and proved to converge towards
logit equilibria in potential games. With the exception of
[3], the majority of these works have focused exclusively on
convergence in potential games, [4]–[6], [13]. In contrast, less
attention has been paid to stable games [14], [15], which
encompass zero-sum games, potential games with concave
payoffs and include well-known examples from evolutionary
game theory such as the Rock-Paper-Scissors (RPS) game.
Motivated by the above, in this paper, we exploit passivity
techniques and the natural monotonicity property associated
with this class of games to show convergence to a Nash
distribution. The use of passivity to investigate game dynamics
was first proposed in [16] for population games, based on the
notion of δ-passivity. The authors showed that certain game
dynamics and the class of stable games, naturally satisfy this
type of passivity. The coupling between a δ-passive system
with a stable game implies a stable behaviour in the closed-
loop solution. [17] showed that if an evolutionary dynamic
does not satisfy a passivity property, then it is possible to
construct a higher-order stable game that results in instability.
Here we use an alternative concept, that of equilibrium-
independent passivity, [18]. This allows us to directly address
convergence towards equilibria. We note that equilibrium-
independent passivity was used recently in [19] for continuous-
kernel games, to relax the assumption on perfect-information
on other players’ actions.
Contributions. Our contributions are twofold: we show (1)
that a passivity framework can be used to prove convergence
of reinforcement learning in finite games, and (2) that its
principles can be used towards designing higher-order learning
dynamics that preserve convergence to a Nash distribution.
Our approach is based on reformulating the overall learning
dynamics of all agents as a feedback interconnected system.
We show that the continuous-time EXP-D-RL scheme, [5], can
be naturally posed as a payoff-feedback system in the dual
space, where the forward system satisfies more than passivity,
namely it is output strictly (equilibrium-independent) passive.
We exploit its particular storage function, related to a Bregman
divergence, as a Lyapunov function and show convergence
of EXP-D-RL to a Nash distribution (logit equilibrium) in
any N -player game for which the (negative) payoff is merely
monotone, not necessarily strict. To the best of our knowledge,
this is the first convergence result for such games. This class of
games corresponds to the class of stable games in population
games [15], and to the class of monotone games in continuous
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2games, [20]. It subsumes, in the case of finite-action games,
potential games with concave potential, 2-player zero-sum
games, as in [3], as well as the standard 2-player RPS game.
Key to our approach is the fact that we analyze convergence
based on the natural, score dynamics, which are in the dual
(payoff) space, as in [6]. This is contrast to analyzing the
induced strategy dynamics as done in [5], and is unlike the
indirect analysis done in [3], via connection to the smooth
best-response. Unlike [5], [6], we show convergence to a Nash
distribution in games that go beyond the class of potential
games, for example the RPS games or the Shapley game.
Furthermore, we exploit cocoercivity of the soft-max to show
convergence even for hypo-monotone games (corresponding
to unstable games in [15]), such as unstable RPS games
and Shapley’s game, is the temperature parameter is above a
certain threshold. To achieve this, we balance the game short-
age of passivity (hypo-monotonicity) by the excess passivity
coming from the soft-max map (cocoercivity).
In the second part of the paper, we build on the passivity
interpretation and propose a method to design higher-order
extensions of EXP-D-RL. Higher order dynamics, via the
introduction of auxiliary states, can have different properties.
They can have significant benefits fostering convergence in
larger classes of games, as shown in [10], [11] for fictitious-
play/gradient-play and in evolutionary games. In reinforce-
ment learning, higher-order extensions of the un-discounted
reinforcement learning have been proposed in [7] based on
second or n-th order payoff-integration (equivalent to a cas-
cade modification of the first-order replicator dynamics by a
chain of integrators). These dynamics have been shown to lead
to the elimination of weakly dominated strategies, followed
by the iterated deletion of strictly dominated strategies, a
property not exhibited by standard replicator dynamics. How-
ever, as shown in [17], such cascade augmentation does not
guarantee that passivity/convergence properties are preserved
when extending from first to higher-order dynamics. Our
second result shows that if higher-order dynamics are built
by feedback modification via a passive system that preserves
the equilibrium point, convergence to a Nash distribution can
be guaranteed in the same class of games. We explicitly
build a second-order learning scheme based on this method,
by specifying a particular LTI positive-real system for the
feedback modification path. We show numerically that these
higher-order dynamics can converge faster and, in some cases,
can converge in larger classes of games (more hypo-monotone)
than the first-order scheme. A short version of this paper will
appear in [37].
The paper is organized as follows. Section II provides
background material. Section III introduces the continuous-
time score-based EXP-D-RL reinforcement learning scheme.
Section IV provides convergence analysis of the first-order
EXP-D-RL scheme. Section V proposes and analyzes a class
of higher-order dynamics. Section VI discusses connections
to population games. Section VII discusses several examples
and presents simulation results. Section VIII provides the
conclusions.
II. BACKGROUND
A. Convex Optimization and Monotone Operator Theory
The following is from [20], [22]. Let z ∈ Rn, z =
[z1, ..., zn]
>, also denoted as z = (z1, ..., zn) or z =
(zi)i={1,...,n}. We assume that Rn is equipped with the
standard inner product 〈z, z′〉 := ∑ni=1 ziz′i = z>z′ and the
induced 2-norm ‖z‖2 :=
√〈z, z〉.
An operator (or mapping) F : D ⊆ Rn → Rn is
said to be monotone on D if (F (z) − F (z′))>(z − z′) ≥
0,∀z, z′ ∈ D. It is strictly monotone if strict inequality
holds ∀z, z′ ∈ D, z 6= z′. F is µ-strongly monotone if
(F (z) − F (z′))>(z − z′) ≥ µ‖z − z′‖22,∀z, z′ ∈ D, for
some µ > 0. We note that a C1 function f is convex if and
only if (∇f(z) − ∇f(z′))>(z − z′) ≥ 0,∀z, z′ ∈ dom f ,
where ∇f is its gradient, and strictly convex if and only if
(∇f(z) − ∇f(z′))>(z − z′) > 0,∀z, z′ ∈ dom f, z 6= z′.
F : D ⊆ Rn → Rn is L-Lipschitz if there exists a L > 0
such that ‖F (z) − F (z′)‖2 ≤ L‖z − z′‖2,∀z, z′ ∈ D. F
is nonexpansive if L = 1, and contractive if L ∈ (0, 1).
F : D ⊆ Rn → Rn is β-cocoercive if there exists a β > 0 such
that (F (z)−F (z′)>(z−z′) ≥ β‖F (z)−F (z)′‖22,∀z, z′ ∈ D.
F is referred to as firmly nonexpansive for β = 1.
B. Equilibrium Independent Passivity
The following are obtained from [18], [23]. Consider Σ
Σ :
{
z˙ = f(z, u),
y = h(z, u),
(1)
with z ∈ Rn, u ∈ Rq , y ∈ Rq , f locally Lipschitz, h
continuous. Consider a differentiable function V : Rn → R.
The time derivative of V along solutions of (1) is V˙ (z) =
∇V (z)>f(z, u) or just V˙ . Let u, z, y be an equilibrium
condition, such that 0 = f(z, u), y = h(z, u). Assume there
exists Γ ⊂ Rq and a continuous function kz(u) such that for
any constant u ∈ Γ, f(kz(u), u)=0 (basic assumption).
Definition 1. System Σ (1) is Equilibrium Independent Pas-
sive (EIP) if it is passive with respect to u and y; that is for
every u ∈ Γ there exists a differentiable, positive semi-definite
storage function Vz : Rn → R such that Vz(z) = 0 and, for
all u ∈ Rq , z ∈ Rn,
V˙z(z) ≤ (y − y)>(u− u), (2)
Σ is output-strictly EIP (OSEIP) if there is aβ > 0 such that
V˙z(z) ≤ (y − y)>(u− u)− β‖y − y‖22, (3)
EIP requires that (2) holds for every u ∈ Γ (Σ to be
passive independent of the equilibrium point), while traditional
passivity, [21] requires that it holds only for a particular
u (usually associated with the origin as equilibrium). EIP
properties help in deriving stability and convergence properties
for feedback systems without requiring exact knowledge of an
equilibrium point, but rather only that it exists. The parallel
interconnection of two EIP systems is an EIP system, and the
feedback interconnection of two EIP systems that satisfies the
basic assumption is an EIP system (cf. Property 2 and 3 in
[18]). When system Σ is just a static map, EIP is equivalent to
incrementally passivity. and to monotonicity. A static nonlinear
function y = F (u) is defined to be EIP (OSEIP) if F
3is monotone (β-cocercive). A linear (output strictly) passive
system, z˙ = Az+Bu, y = Cz+Du, with (A,B) controllable,
(A,C) observable, and A invertible is (OS)EIP (cf. Ex. 1
in [18]). This can be shown using V (z − z), where V is
the quadratic storage function associated with the passivity of
the linear system relative to the origin equilibrium, by direct
application of the KYP lemma (cf. Section 6.4 of [21]). The
additional requirement of invertibility of A is necessary to
satisfy the basic assumption on the existence and continuity
of kz , which is defined by kz(u) = −A−1Bu. The equilibrium
input-output map is defined by ky(u) = (−CA−1B +D)u.
C. Games in Normal Form
Consider a game G between a set of players (agents)
N = {1, . . . , N}, where each player p ∈ N has a finite set
of actions (or pure strategies) Ap, and a payoff Up : A → R,
with A = ∏p∈N Ap the overall action set of all players, [9].
Let |Ap| = np and n = ∑p∈N np. Without loss of
generality we identify Ap as the corresponding index set, i.e.,
Ap = {1, . . . , np} and denote a generic action as i ∈ Ap.
Let xp = (xpi )i∈Ap denote the mixed strategy of player p,
a probability distribution over his set of actions Ap. Then
xp ∈ ∆p, where ∆p := {xp ∈ Rnp≥0|‖xp‖1 = 1} is the set
of mixed strategies for player p. A mixed strategy profile is
denoted as x = (x1, . . . , xN ) ∈ ∆, where ∆ := ∏p∈N ∆p is
called the game’s strategy space. We also use the shorthand
notation x = (xp;x−p) where x−p is the strategy profile of
the other players except p. Player p’s expected payoff to using
xp in the mixed strategy profile x = (x1, . . . , xN ) ∈ ∆ is
Up(x) =
∑
i1∈A1
· · ·
∑
iN∈AN
Up(i1, . . . , iN )x1i1 . . . xNiN , (4)
where Up(i) ≡ Up(i1, . . . , iN ) denotes his payoff in the pure
(action) profile i = {i1, . . . , iN} ∈ A, with ip ∈ Ap. We
denote by Upi (x) ≡ Up(i;x−p) ≡ Up(x1, . . . , i, . . . , xN ), his
expected payoff corresponding to using pure strategy i ∈ Ap
in the mixed profile x ∈ ∆. Note that we can write (4) as
Up(x) =
∑
i∈Ap
Up(i;x−p)xpi =
∑
i∈Ap
xpi U
p
i (x), (5)
or Up(x) = xp>Up(x), where Up(x) = (Upi (x))i∈Ap ∈ Rn
p
is called the payoff vector of player p at x ∈ ∆, indicating
the duality pairing between xp and Up, [9]. With the players’
(expected) payoffs Up : ∆→ R, the tuple (N ,∆,U) is called
the mixed extension of G also denoted by G.
Definition 2. A mixed strategy profile x? ∈ ∆ is a Nash
equilibrium of game G if
Up(x?) ≥ Up(xp;x?−p), ∀xp ∈ ∆p,∀p ∈ N . (6)
Define the mixed best-response map of player p, BRp : ∆→
∆p, x 7→ argmaxxp∈∆p Up(x). Then x? satisfies
x?p ∈ BRp(x?), ∀p ∈ N , (7)
or x? ∈ BR(x?), where BR = (BRp)p∈N , i.e., x? is a
fixed-point of the overall best-response map of all players.
Alternatively, by (5), (6), x?p>Up(x?) ≥ xp>Up(x?),∀xp ∈
∆p,∀p ∈ N , or, by concatenating them,
− (x− x?)>U(x?) ≥ 0,∀x ∈ ∆ (8)
where U : ∆→ Rn, U(x) = (Up(x))p∈N , denotes the payoff
vector of the entire set of players, or the game (static) map.
Thus x? can be equivalently characterized as a solution of the
variational inequality, VI(−U,∆), (8), [20].
III. EXPONENTIALLY-DISCOUNTED LEARNING
(EXP-D-RL)
In the following, we describe the score-based reinforcement
learning (RL) scheme, modeled in continuous-time as in [5],
[7], [9]. Each player keeps a score zp based on his received
payoff Up, and maps it into a strategy xp ∈ ∆p. He plays
the game G according to the strategy xp. This process is
repeated indefinitely, with an infinitesimal time-step between
each stage; hence can be modeled in continuous-time, as a
three stage process, described as follows:
(1) Assessment Stage: Each player p keeps a vector score
variable zp(t) ∈ Rnp , zp = (zpi )i∈Ap , with each i-th action
i ∈ Ap having a score zpi ∈ R. Starting from an initial score,
he updates it based on exponentially-discounted aggregation
(learning) (EXP-D-RL) of his own payoff stream,
zpi (t) = e
−γtzpi (0) + γ
t∫
0
e−γ(t−τ)upi (τ)dτ, (EXP-D-RL)
or, in differential form,
z˙pi = γ(u
p
i − zpi ), zpi (0) ∈ R, ∀i ∈ Ap. (9)
where upi (t) = U
p
i (x(t)), γ > 0 is the learning rate and z
p
i (0)
is the bias towards strategy i at the beginning of the game.
EXP-D-RL can be represented by a scalar-valued transfer
function G(s) =
γ
s+ γ
, similar to the scheme studied in [5],
where G(s) =
1
s+ T
. The case G(s) =
1
s
, i.e., integration of
the (un-discounted) payoff is studied in [9], [7].
(2) Choice Stage: Each player p maps his own score zp ∈
Rnp , into a mixed strategy xp ∈ ∆p using a choice map, e.g.
the best-response choice, Mp : zp 7→ argmaxxp∈∆p xp>zp.
To ensure that Mp is single-valued, an at-least strictly convex
function ψp called regularizer is used, [9], which yields the
regularized/smooth best-response choice,
σp : zp 7→ argmaxxp∈∆p {xp>zp − ψp(xp)}. (10)
Depending on the context, the regularizer is also referred
to as admissible deterministic perturbation, penalty function,
smoothing function, barrier function or Bregman function. For
detailed construction of the regularizer, [9]. We consider the
commonly used (negative) Gibbs entropy,
ψp(xp) := 
∑
j∈Apx
p
j log(x
p
j ),  > 0, (11)
for which the choice map (10) is the soft-max function [9],
σp(zp) :=
1∑
j∈Apexp(
1
 z
p
j )
[
exp( 1 z
p
1). . .exp(
1
 z
p
n)
]>
(12)
where  > 0. Note that σp : Rnp → int(∆p), where
int(∆p) = {xp ∈ R|Ap||‖xp‖1 = 1, xpi > 0} is the (relative)
interior of the simplex ∆p.  is typically referred to as the
temperature parameter. For  = 1, (12) is known as the
standard soft-max function. As  → ∞, actions are selected
with uniform probability, and as → 0, the soft-max function
selects the action associated with the highest score, provided
4that the difference between any two scores is not too small.
With σp, the mixed strategy for player p is taken as,
xp(t) = σp(zp(t)) :=
[
σp1(z
p), . . . , σpnp(z
p)
]>
, (13)
where xpi = σ
p
i (z
p),∀i ∈ Ap.
(3) Game Stage: Each player p plays the game G according
to his strategy xp and records his own payoff vector up :=
Up(x) = (Upi (x))i∈Ap , where u
p
i (t) = U
p
i (x(t)), ∀i ∈ Ap.
Then, with zp = (zpi )i∈Ap , (9), x
p, (13), and σp in (12), the
EXP-D-RL scheme for player p ∈ N is written as,
z˙p = γ(Up(x)− zp), zp(0) ∈ Rnp
xp = σp(zp),
(14)
Remark 1. Similar forms of “exponentially-discounted” score
dynamics have been investigated in [5] [6], [26]. When γ = 1,
(14) coincides with the learning rule studied in [5] for the
discount factor T = 1. When γ 6= 1 there is a slight difference:
we use γ not only as a discount factor (as T in [5]), but also
as a multiplicative factor (learning rate), and by doing so the
rest points of (14) are independent of γ. Structurally, EXP-
D-RL is similar to online mirror descent (OMD) in convex
optimization, recently studied for continuous games in [27],
[28]. In particular, the score zp is the dual variable to the
primal variable xp. Therefore, (14) describes the evolution of
learning in the dual space Rnp , whereas the induced strategy
trajectory describes the evolution in the primal space ∆p. This
type of duality is discussed in [9]. Lastly, we note that using
stochastic approximation, (14) corresponds to the individual
Q-learning algorithm, which has been shown to converge
in 2-player zero-sum games and 2-player partnership games
(Proposition 4.2, [3]).
Remark 2. Note that a first-order Euler discretization of the
dynamics (14), with discretization step α, is
Zp(k + 1) = Zp(k) + αγ
(
Up(X(k))− Zp(k)
)
Xp(k + 1) = σp(Zp(k + 1))
where Xp(k) = (Xpi (k))iAp is the mixed-strategy and X
p
i (k)
the probability of playing i ∈ Ap at the k-th instance of
play. This recursion tracks (14) arbitrarily well over finite-time
horizons when the discretization step α is sufficiently small,
but requires perfect monitoring of the mixed strategies of the
other players. This can be relaxed if players are assumed to
possess a bounded, unbiased estimate of their actions’ payoffs,
or if they observe their in-game realized payoffs. In fact, (14)
is the mean field of the discrete-time stochastic process, [8],
Zp(k + 1) = Zp(k) + α(k)γ
(
uˆp(k)− Zp(k)
)
Xp(k + 1) = σp(Zp(k + 1))
where uˆp(k) = (uˆpi (k))i∈Ap is an unbiased estimator of
Up(X(k)), i.e., such that E(uˆp(k)) = Up(X(k)), and {α(k)}
is a diminishing sequence of step-sizes, e.g. 1k+1 . If player p
can observe the action profile i−p(k) played by his opponents
(or can otherwise calculate his strategies’ payoffs), such an es-
timate is provided by uˆpi (k) = Up(i; i−p(k)). If instead player
p can only observe the payoff pip(k) := Up(i(k); i−p(k))
of his chosen action, then a typical choice for uˆpi (k) is
uˆpi (k) = pi
p(k)/Xpi (k), if i(k) = i, [3], [5], [9], where
division by Xpi (k) compensates for the infrequency with
which the score of the i-th strategy is updated. Results from
the theory of stochastic approximation [8] can be used to tie
convergence of such discrete-time algorithms to the asymptotic
behaviour of (14), (see [5]). In this paper we restrict our focus
to the continuous-time learning scheme, as in [9], [10], [12].
IV. CONVERGENCE OF EXP-D-RL DYNAMICS
In this section we analyze the convergence of EXP-D-RL,
(14). Let z = (zp)p∈N ∈ Rn, x = (xp)p∈N and U(x) =
(Up(x))p∈N denote the score vector, stacked mixed-strategies
and the overall payoff vector for all players, respectively. With
(14), EXP-D-RL is written all players as{
z˙ = γ(U(x)− z), z(0) ∈ Rn
x = σ(z),
(15)
where σ(z) := (σp(zp))p∈N , σ : Rn → int(∆).
Given that the payoff functions Up(x) are Lipschitz and
bounded on ∆, the scores zp(t) will remain finite for all t ≥ 0,
so x(t) = σ(z(t)) will be defined for all t ≥ 0 and x(t) ∈ ∆
for all t ≥ 0. Moreover, xpi (t) > 0, t ≥ 0, hence only strategy
trajectories on the interior of the simplex are obtained. Note
−U(·)
u z
σ(·) x− In ⊗
γ
s+ γ
x
Σ
Fig. 1: EXP-D-RL (15) as feedback interconnection
that with u = U(x), EXP-D-RL (15) can be represented as
the feedback interconnection in Figure 1, between Σ
Σ :
{
z˙ = γ(u− z)
x = σ(z),
(16)
and u = U(x), where U is the game (static) map. In
the following we characterize the asymptotic behaviour of
solutions of (15).
A. Equilibrium Points of EXP-D-RL
System (15) is written as,
z˙ = γ((U ◦ σ)(z)− z), x = σ(z), (17)
where U ◦ σ : Rn → Rn, z 7→ U(σ(z)). Note that
σ : Rn → ∆ is Lipschitz (we show in Proposition 2) and
since U is Lipschitz and bounded, existence and uniqueness
of global solutions of (17) follows from standard arguments.
An equilibrium (rest) point z? is z? = (U ◦ σ)(z?), hence
a fixed point of the map z 7→ (U ◦ σ)(z). The existence of
a fixed point is guaranteed by Brouwer’s fixed-point theorem
provided that U ◦ σ is a continuous function with bounded
range [6]. Based on (16), such a z? can be represented as,{
u? = z? = U(x?)
x? = σ(z?).
(18)
From (18), it follows that, over the set of rest points of
(17), the function z? 7→ σ(z?) has an inverse given by
x? 7→ U(x?). As shown next, any x? = σ(z?) corresponding
to (18) is a Nash equilibrium of a game with perturbed payoff
5(Nash distribution), and for small  it approximates the Nash
equilibria of G, (see also [32] and Proposition 2, [6]). Note
that as →∞, all actions of each player p are selected with
uniform probability 1/np and there exists a unique x? at the
centroid of the simplex ∆.
Proposition 1. Any x? = σ(z?), where z? is a rest point of
(17), is a Nash equilibrium of game G with perturbed payoff,
Up(x) = Up(x)−  xp>logp(xp), (19)
where logp(xp) =
[
log(xp1), . . . , log(x
p
n)
]>
,  > 0.
Proof. Recall from (10)-(12), that for all p ∈ N ,
σp(zp) = argmaxxp∈∆p {xp>zp − 
∑
j∈Apx
p
j log(x
p
j )} =
argmaxxp∈∆p x
p>(zp−logp(xp)). On the other hand, by (7)
and (5), a Nash equilibrium of G with perturbed payoff (19), is
a fixed-point of the (perturbed) best-response function BR =
(BR
p
)p∈N , where BR
p
(x) = argmaxxp∈∆px
p>(Up(x) −
logp(xp)) and Up(x) is independent of xp (by (5)). Thus,
∀p ∈ N , we can write BRp(x) = σp(zp), where zp = Up(x),
or, concatenating all relations, BR(x) = σ(z), where z =
U(x). A fixed-point of BR satisfies x = BR(x) = σ(z),
where z = U(x), which are exactly (18).
Remark 3. We note that x? = σ(z?) corresponding to
(18) is referred to as a Nash distribution, [3], a (perturbed)
logit equilibrium of the game [15, p. 191], or a type of
quantal response equilibrium (QRE), [31]. It satisfies x? =
σ(U(x?)) := BR(x?)), hence is a fixed-point of σ◦U , which
also exists by Brouwer’s fixed point theorem (Theorem 1, [31])
and is parameterized by . At a Nash distribution x? each
player plays a smooth best-response (σp) to payoffs arising
from the others’ play.
B. Soft-max Choice Map and Passivity of Σ
Recall the feedback representation of EXP-D-RL (15) in
Figure 1. The following results give properties for σ =
(σp)p∈N and Σ, (16), related to passivity. First for σp, (12),
p ∈ N , consider
lsep(zp) :=  ln
(∑
j∈Ap exp(
−1zpj )
)
,  > 0, (20)
the log-sum-exp function, (C2 and convex by [22, p. 72]).
Since the following properties are valid for σp, (12), for
all p ∈ N , without loss of generality, we consider p = 1
(drop the superscript) and denote σ and lse. Note that σ is not
injective and σ(z + c1) = σ(z), for all z ∈ Rn, c ∈ R, where
1 =
[
1, . . . , 1
]> ∈ Rn.
Proposition 2. The soft-max function σ : Rn → int(∆)
satisfies the following properties:
(i) σ is gradient of lse : Rn → R, that is, ∇ lse(z) = σ(z).
(ii) σ is monotone, i.e.,
(σ(z)− σ(z′))>(z − z′) ≥ 0,∀z, z′ ∈ Rn,
(iii) σ is −1-Lipschitz, that is,
‖σ(z)− σ(z′)‖2 ≤ −1‖z − z′‖2,∀z, z′ ∈ Rn,
where  > 0 is the temperature constant.
(iv) σ is -cocoercive, that is,
(σ(z)− σ(z′))>(z − z′) ≥ ‖σ(z)− σ(z′)‖22,∀z, z′ ∈ Rn.
Proof. (i) Evaluating the partial derivative of lse in (20) at each
component of z yields
∂ lse(z)
∂zi
=
exp(−1zi)∑n
j=1 exp(
−1zj)
= σi(z),
for all i = {1, . . . , n}, hence ∇ lse(z) = σ(z).
(ii) The log-sum-exp function is C2 and convex, based on
positive semi-definiteness of ∇2 lse(z) [22, p. 74]. Together
with (i), this implies that σ is monotone.
(iii) For the Hessian of lse, it can be shown ( [22, p. 74]) that
v>∇2 lse(z)v = −1
(∑n
i=1v
2
i σi(z)− (
∑n
i=1viσi(z))
2
)
,
for all z, v ∈ Rn, hence, v>∇2 lse(z)v ≤
−1supz{σi(z)}
n∑
i=1
v2i . Since supz{σi(z)} = 1,∀i and
∇2 lse(z) is positive semidefinite, this implies that
0 ≤ v>∇2 lse(z)v ≤ −1‖v‖22.
By (i) and Theorem 2.1.6 in [25], σ is −1-Lipschitz.
(iv) -cocoercivity of σ follows directly from the Baillon-
Haddad theorem [34, p. 40], since σ is the gradient of lse
by (i), and is −1-Lipschitz by (iii).
Remark 4. By Proposition 2(iv), σp is -cocoercive for all
p ∈ N , therefore, σ = (σp)p∈N is -cocoercive,
(σ(z)− σ(z′))>(z − z′) ≥ ‖σ(z)− σ(z′)‖22,∀z, z′, (21)
or, equivalently, output-strictly EIP (OSEIP).
Next, we characterize Σ (16).
Proposition 3. System Σ (16) is output-strictly EIP (OSEIP).
Proof. At an equilibrium condition of (16), z = u and x =
σ(z). Consider the following candidate storage function,
Vz(z)=
∑
p∈N
(
lsep(zp)− lsep(zp)−∇ lsep(zp)>(zp − zp)
)
,
(22)
(the Bregman divergence of lse, [25]), with Vz(z) = 0, lsep
as in (20), convex. By Proposition 2(i), ∇ lsep = σp. By
convexity of lsep, Vz(z) ≥ 0,∀z ∈ Rn. Taking the time
derivative of Vz(z) along (16) using z = u yields,
V˙z(z) =∇Vz(z)>z˙ =
∑
p∈Nγ(σ
p(zp)− σp(zp))>(−zp + up)
=
∑
p∈Nγ(σ
p(zp)− σp(zp))>(−zp + zp − zp + up)
=γ(σ(z)− σ(z))>[−(z − z) + (u− u)],
Using (21) in the foregoing yields
V˙z(z) ≤ −γ‖σ(z)−σ(z)‖22+γ(σ(z)−σ(z))>(u−u), (23)
With x = σ(z), x = σ(z), Σ, (16) is OSEIP, cf. (3).
Remark 5. Note that Vz(z) =
∑
p∈NDlsep(z
p, zp), where
Dlsep(z
p, zp) is the Bregman divergence of lsep, i.e. the
difference between the log-sum-exp function and its lin-
ear approximation at zp, [25]. Using Theorem 2.1.5, [25],

2‖σ(z)− σ(z)‖22 ≤ Vz(z) ≤ 
−1
2 ‖z − z‖22, ∀z, z ∈ Rn.
C. Convergence Analysis
Next, based on the representation in Figure 1 (feedback
interconnection between Σ, (16) and the static game map −U
on the feedback path), we analyze the asymptotic behaviour
of EXP-D-RL (15) by leveraging passivity properties of Σ.
First, solutions z(t) of (15) remain bounded, (see also
proof of Lemma 3.2, [3]). To see this, note that since Upi
6is continuous, and x ∈ ∆, Upi (x) is bounded, i.e., there is
some M > 0 such that |Upi (x)| ≤ M for any x ∈ ∆, for
all p ∈ N , i ∈ Ap. From the integral form of EXP-D-RL,
we can write for all p ∈ N , i ∈ Ap, |zpi (t)| ≤ e−γt|zpi (0)|+
γ
t∫
0
e−γ(t−τ)|Upi (x(τ))|dτ ≤ e−γt|zpi (0)|+M(1−e−γt) hence
|zpi (t)| ≤ max{|zpi (0)|,M}, ∀t ≥ 0. Also, Ω = {z ∈
Rn|‖z‖2 ≤
√
nM} is a compact, positively invariant set.
We make the following assumption on the payoff U .
Assumption 1. (i) The negative payoff, −U(·), is monotone,
− (x− x′)>(U(x)− U(x′)) ≥ 0, ∀x, x′ ∈ ∆. (24)
(ii) The negative payoff, −U(·), is µ-hypo-monotone, i.e.,
− (x− x′)>(U(x)− U(x′)) ≥ −µ‖x− x′‖22, (25)
for some µ > 0, for all x, x′ ∈ ∆.
Remark 6. The monotonicity in Assumption 1(i) (µ = 0)
is equivalent −U(·) being EIP and incrementally passive. In
population games, Assumption 1(i) corresponds to G being a
stable game cf. [14], while in games with continuous actions
it corresponds to games with monotone pseudo-gradient map,
[20]. Assumption 1(ii) (as “hypo-monotone” in [36]) corre-
sponds to an unstable game and is equivalent to shortage of
monotonicity (passivity) of −U(·) as described by µ > 0.
Remark 7. As in stable games, [15], Assumption 1(i) can be
characterized via y>DU(x)y ≤ 0, for all x ∈ ∆, y ∈ T∆,
and Assumption 1(ii) via y>DU(x)y ≤ µ‖y‖22, for all
x ∈ ∆, y ∈ T∆, where DU(x) is the Jacobian of U(x) and
T∆ =
∏
p∈N T∆
p, T∆p := {yp ∈ Rnp |∑i∈Ap ypi = 0} is
the tangent space of ∆p. For 2-player games, U is linear and
(24) can be checked based on the payoff matrices of the two
players, A and B. Since
U(x) =
[
U1(x)
U2(x)
]
=
[
0 A
B> 0
] [
x1
x2
]
:= Φx,
hence (24) is −(x − x′)>Φ(x − x′) ≥ 0, for all x, x′ ∈ ∆,
equivalent to y>(Φ + Φ>)y ≤ 0 for all y ∈ T∆, or Φ + Φ>
is negative semidefinite with respect to T∆. This is met for
example in zero-sum games, where B = −A, hence Φ is skew-
symmetric and x>Φx = 0, for all x ∈ ∆. Another class is the
class of concave potential games where the payoff vector U(x)
can be expressed as the gradient of a C1, concave potential
function P , as in congestion games, [15], [6], [4]. In Section
VI we consider several examples.
Theorem 1. Let G be a finite game with players’ learning
schemes as given by EXP-D-RL, (14) or (15) (Figure 1).
Assume there are a finite number of isolated fixed-points z?
of U ◦ σ. Then, under Assumption 1(i), for any  > 0,
players’ scores z(t) = (zp(t))p∈N converge to a rest point z?,
while players’ strategies x(t) = (xp(t))p∈N , x(t) = σ(z(t))
converge to a Nash distribution x? = σ(z?) of G. Under
Assumption 1(ii), the same conclusions hold for any  > µ.
Proof. The proof is based on the representation of (15) in
Figure 1 and passivity properties of Σ (16) in Proposition 3.
First, recall that Ω is a compact, positively invariant set. Let
z? be a rest point of (17), z? = u? = U(σ(z?)), x? = σ(z?),
(cf. (18)) is a Nash distribution. Consider as Lyapunov function
the storage function V , (22) at z?, i.e.,
Vz?(z)=
∑
p∈N
(
lsep(zp)−lsep(zp?)−∇ lsep(zp?)>(zp−zp?)
)
(26)
where Vz?(z?) = 0, and Vz?(z) ≥ 0,∀z ∈ Rn. Moreover,
using (20), ∇ lsep = σp and ∑j∈Ap σpj (zp) = 1, it can be
shown that Vz?(z? + 1c) = 0, ∀c ∈ R, so Vz?(·) is positive
semidefinite, but not positive definite. Take the time derivative
of Vz?(z) along solutions of (17). Then, (23) holds and setting
u = u? and z = z?, yields
V˙z?(z) ≤ −γ‖σ(z)−σ(z?)‖22 + γ(σ(z)−σ(z?))>(u−u?).
(27)
By (16), (18), u = U(σ(z)), u? = U(σ(z?)) and using
Assumption 1(i) for x = σ(z), x? = σ(z?), it follows that
the second term in (27) is non-positive, hence
V˙z?(z) ≤− γ‖σ(z)− σ(z?)‖22. (28)
Thus for any  > 0, V˙z?(z) ≤ 0,∀z ∈ Rn, and V˙z?(z) = 0,
for all z ∈ E = {z ∈ Ω|σ(z) = σ(z?)}. We apply LaSalle’s
invariance principle, [21], and find the largest invariant subset
M of E for (17). On E the dynamics of (17) reduce to
z˙ = γ
(
U(σ(z?))− z
)
= γ(z? − z).
Since γ > 0, z(t) → z? as t → ∞, for any z(0) ∈ E .
Thus, no other solution except z? can stay forever in E , and
M consists only of equilibria. Since by assumption (17) has a
finite number of isolated equilibria z?, by LaSalle’s invariance
principle, [21], it follows that for any z(0) ∈ Ω, z(t) converges
to one of them. By continuity of σ, it follows that x(t) =
σ(z(t)) converges to σ(z?) which is a Nash distribution.
Alternatively, from (28) since Vz?(z(t)) is non-increasing
and bounded from below by 0, it converges as t → ∞. Fur-
thermore,
>∫
0
‖σ(z(τ))−σ(z?)‖22dτ≤
1
γ
[Vz?(z(0))−Vz?(z(t))].
Since Vz?(z(t)) converges, by the comparison principle it
follows that lim
t→∞
>∫
0
‖σ(z(τ))−σ(z?)‖22dτ = lim
t→∞
>∫
0
‖x(τ)−
x?‖22dτ exists (finite). Since x(t) is bounded, x˙(t) is uni-
formly bounded in t and x(t) is uniformly continuous. From
Barbalat’s lemma [21], we conclude that x(t) = σ(z(t))
converges to x? = σ(z?) as t→∞.
Under Assumption 1(ii), from (27), instead of (28), the
following inequality is obtained
V˙z?(z) ≤− γ‖σ(z)− σ(z?)‖22 + γµ‖σ(z)− σ(x?)‖22,
or, V˙z?(z) ≤ −γ(−µ)‖σ(z)−σ(z?)‖22. Thus, for any  > µ,
this is as (28) and the proof can follow as in the above.
Remark 8. In general, convergence is to the set of Nash
distributions. This is the case of potential games, where
multiple (logit) equilibria can exist. This is the same as for
the smooth best-response dynamics (cf. Theorem 3.3 [29]).
On the other hand, any 2-player zero-sum game has a unique
Nash distribution, (cf. Theorem 3.2, in [29]). Thus, Theorem 1
is similar to results for the perturbed best-response dynamics,
(cf. Theorem 3.3 and 3.2, in [29]), or Q-learning (Proposition
4.2 in [3]), but is valid for N -player games. We note that
in [5], based on analyzing the primal (induced) strategy
dynamics, Proposition 3.4 shows that x(t) converges to a
7logit equilibrium of G in potential games, while Theorem
3.8 shows that perturbed strict Nash equilibria are asymp-
totically stable for small enough T . Theorem 1 analyzes the
dual (score) dynamics and shows that under Assumption 1(i)
(monotonicity of −U ), players converge arbitrarily close to a
Nash equilibrium (not necessarily strict), by taking small  (cf.
Proposition 1). Under hypo-monotonicity, Assumption 1(ii),
convergence to a Nash distribution is guaranteed for  > µ,
based on balancing the shortage of passivity of −U by the
excess passivity (OSEIP) of Σ. Our results can be also applied
to monocyclic games, [30], which only have mixed NEs and
which generalize the Rock-Paper-Scissor game (see Section
VI). Proposition 3 in [30] shows that in an unstable game
(A is positive definite) a completely mixed perturbed NE (or
an NDE) is unstable for sufficiently small  under the smooth
best-response dynamics. Based on Assumption 1(ii), our result
in Theorem 1 characterizes the range of  that guarantees
convergence to a Nash distribution under EXP-D-RL dynamics
in an unstable game. Of course, too large an  moves the Nash
distribution away from the Nash equilibrium, so a trade-off
exists. Several examples are discussed in Section VI.
Remark 9. Theorem 1 is related to passivity-based feedback
(PBF) output regulation [33]. In our case, the output-strictly
EIP system Σ has the output x = σ(z) regulated to σ(z?)
instead of to the origin, and the static output feedback is
u = U(x), which itself is PBF for any payoff U satisfying
Assumption 1(i). In fact, Σ is z?-detectable, and z(t) con-
verges to z? (since Vz? is positive semidefinite, we can show
only attractivity). We also note that a similar approach can be
considered for the un-discounted EXP-RL in [9], [7], for which
G(s) = 1s and Σ is only lossless EIP. Then convergence is
guaranteed for games with payoff U satisfying a strict version
of Assumption 1(i), (strictly stable games in [15]).
V. PASSIVITY-BASED HIGHER-ORDER EXP-D-RL
In this section, we propose a class of higher-order extension
of the EXP-D-RL scheme (14), based on passivity arguments.
Suppose instead that during game play, each player p contin-
uously aggregates his own strategy xp ∈ ∆p over time into an
adjustment variable vpa ∈ Rnp, as given by ξ˙p = Aξp +Bxp,
vpa = Cξ
p + Dxp. After receiving his payoff, the player
subtracts the variable from the payoff up to form an adjusted
payoff u˜p = up − vpa and aggregates the adjusted payoff u˜p
into a score zp. Thus player p (H-EXP-D-RL) learning scheme
is given by
z˙p = γ(−zp + Up(x)− vpa), zp(0) ∈ Rn
p
ξ˙p = Aξp +Bxp
vpa = Cξ
p +Dxp
xp = σp(zp),
(29)
with ξp(0) = 0. Let u˜ := u − va denote the overall adjusted
payoff, where va denotes the overall adjustment. Then the
overall players’ learning dynamics (29) is given as

z˙ = γ(−z + u− va), z ∈ Rn, ξ(0) ∈ Rn
ξ˙ = A ξ +Bx
va = C ξ +Dx
x = σ(z)
u = U(x),
(30)
where A, B, C, D are block-diagonal matrices with A,B,C,D
on the diagonal, respectively. Note that the modified H-EXP-
D-RL scheme (30) can be represented as in Figure 2, as
a feedback interconnection between Σ˜ and U , a feedback
modification to EXP-D-RL in Figure 1 where,
Ha(s) := C(sIn −A)−1B+D, (31)
is as a payoff-adjustment learning rule.
−U(·)
u z
σ(·) x− In ⊗
γ
s+ γ
Σ˜
Ha(s)
u˜
va
−
x
Fig. 2: H-EXP-D-RL (29) as feedback interconnection
In Figure 2, the forward path between u˜ and x is Σ as
in (16), which is OSEIP by Proposition 3. This means that
feedback interconnection with another EIP system Ha will be
preserve passivity properties. This is used next.
Theorem 2. Let G be a finite game with players’ higher-
order learning schemes as given by H-EXP-D-RL, (29), or
(30) represented as in Figure 2. Assume there are a finite
number of isolated fixed-points z? of U ◦ σ. Assume that
(31) is proper, strictly positive real, and Ha(0) = 0n.
Then, under Assumption 1(i), for any  > 0, players’ scores
z(t) = (zp(t))p∈N converge to a z?, while players’ strategies
x(t) = (xp(t))p∈N , x(t) = σ(z(t)) converge to a Nash
distribution x? = σ(z?) of G. Under Assumption 1(ii), the
same conclusions hold for any  > µ.
Proof. At an equilibrium condition (ξ
?
,z?,x?,u?,v?a) of (30),
0 = γ(−z? + u? − v?a)
0 = A ξ
?
+Bx?, v?a = Cξ
?
+Dx?
x? = σ(z?), u? = U(x?).
(32)
From the first and last line, z? = U(σ(z?)) − v?a. Since
Ha is strictly positive real, A is Hurwitz, hence is invertible
and from the second line we obtain, ξ
?
= −A−1Bx?
and v?a = (−CA−1B+D)x?. By assumption Ha(0) =
−CA−1B+D = 0n, so that v?a = 0, and therefore
(32) reduces to (18). Thus, under H-EXP-D-RL, equilibria
points z? under EXP-D-RL are preserved, and x? is a Nash
distribution of G. To prove convergence of x(t) to x? we
leverage passivity properties of the subsystems in Figure 2.
Specifically, by Assumption 1(i), −U is incrementally passive,
Σ from u˜ to x is OSEIP (cf. Proposition 3) and Ha is EIP
passive.
8Consider the positive semidefinite storage function of Σ,
Vz?(z), (26), as in the proof of Theorem 1. Taking the time
derivative of Vz?(z) along the solutions z(t) in (30), using the
cocoercivity of σ and following the proof of Proposition 3, it
can be shown that V˙z?(z) = ∇Vz?(z)>z˙ satisfies
V˙z?(z) ≤− γ‖σ(z)− σ(z?)‖22 + γ(σ(z)−σ(z?))>(u− u?)
− γ(σ(z)−σ(z?))>(va − v∗a). (33)
Since Ha(s) is strictly positive real, it is strictly passive and
has a quadratic storage function Va(ξ) =
γ
2
(ξ − ξ?)>P(ξ −
ξ
?
), where P is a positive definite matrix as given by the
KYP Lemma, [21], and the time derivative of Va along ξ(t),
V˙a(ξ) = ∇Va(ξ)>ξ˙, satisfies,
V˙a(ξ) ≤ γ(va − v?a)>(x− x?). (34)
Consider the composite Lyapunov function W (z, ξ) :=
Vz?(z)+Va(ξ). By construction, W (z, ξ) is positive semidefi-
nite. Taking the time derivative along the solution trajectories
of (30), W˙ (z, ξ) = V˙a(ξ) + V˙z?(z) = ∇Vz?(z)>z˙ +∇Va(ξ)ξ˙,
and using (33), (34) and σ(z) = x,σ(z?) = x?, yields,
W˙ (z, ξ) =V˙a(ξ) + V˙z?(z)
≤ −γ‖σ(z)−σ(z?)‖22+γ(σ(z)−σ(z?))>(u− u?),
which is similar to (27). From this point, the proof follows
using the same arguments as in the proof of Theorem 1, with
A Hurwitz being used to show that the largest invariant subset
of (30) is M = {(z?, ξ?)}, where ξ? = −A−1Bσ(z?).
Remark 10. We note that the higher-order dynamics proposed
here, designed based on passivity principles, is guaranteed
to maintain the same properties of convergence in monotone
(stable) games as the first-order dynamics. This is unlike the
higher-order dynamics proposed in [7] based on second-order
(n-th order) integration of payoffs, which, as shown in [17],
are no longer passive and for which convergence in stable
games is no longer guaranteed.
A specific second-order score dynamics from this class of
RL schemes can be obtained for
Ga(s) =
Ks
s+ a
, (35)
where K, a > 0. Ha(s) = In ⊗Ga(s) satisfies the conditions
in Theorem 2 (by Lemma 6.1 in [21]). Then A = −aInp ,
B = −aInp , C = D = KInp , and H-EXP-D-RL (29) is
z˙p = γ(−zp + up −K(ξp + xp)), zp(0) ∈ Rnp
ξ˙p = −aξp − axp, ξ(0)p = 0
xp = σp(zp),
(36)
where up = Up(x). Note that (35) represents a high-pass filter.
We show in Section VII that for cyclical games such as the
Rock-Paper-Scissors game, such a scheme can in fact foster
convergence.
VI. CONNECTION TO POPULATION GAMES
In this section we offer a population game interpretation for
the induced mixed-strategy dynamics of the reinforcement
learning scheme. A population game involves a single (or
multiple) large population(s) of agents interacting, whose
members are anonymous. The agents are repeatedly randomly
matched to play a symmetric two-player normal form game
defined by strategy set Ap and a payoff matrix A, or they could
play “the field”, as in congestion games, [15]. The identifi-
cation between a large population game and continuous-time
reinforcement learning is based on the fact that the dynamical
equations governing the evolution of population states and
those governing the evolution of mixed strategies are the same.
Consider first the induced strategy dynamics under EXP-D-
RL, obtained as the set of ODEs that describe the evolution
x(t) on ∆, as induced by the score dynamics (14) on Rn. Note
that based on xpi =
exp(−1zpi )∑
k∈Ap exp(
−1zpk)
for all i ∈ Ap, we
obtain for all i, j ∈ Ap
log(xpi )− log(xpj ) = −1(zpi − zpj ) (37)
Taking the time derivative on both sides yields xpj x˙
p
i = x
p
i x˙
p
j+
xpi x
p
j 
−1(z˙pi −z˙pj ). Summing this over all j ∈ Ap on both sides
and using
∑
j∈Ap x
p
j = 1 and
∑
j∈Ap x˙
p
j = 0 yields x˙
p
i =
−1xpi (z˙
p
i −
∑
j∈Apx
p
j z˙
p
j ). Based on EXP-D-RL, substituting
in z˙pi and z˙
p
j from (14) into the last expression, we obtain:
x˙pi = γ
−1[xpi (u
p
i −
∑
j∈Apx
p
ju
p
j )− xpi (zpi −
∑
j∈Apx
p
jz
p
j )]
(38)
where upi = U
p
i (x) and z
p
i is generated by EXP-D-RL.
An alternative form is obtained by multiplying (37) by xpj ,
summing over j ∈ Ap and using∑j∈Ap xpj = 1, which yields:
log(xpi )−
∑
j∈Apx
p
j log(x
p
j ) = 
−1(zpi −
∑
j∈Apx
p
jz
p
j )
Substituting the above expression into (38), we obtain
x˙pi = γ
−1xpi (u
p
i −
∑
j∈Apx
p
ju
p
j ) + γx
p
i (
∑
j∈Apx
p
j log(
xpj
xpi
))
(39)
Next, we study connections between (38) or (39) and
existing population dynamics. Consider a single (or multi-
ple) population(s) of agents. Each agent in population p is
preprogrammed to play a certain pure strategy i ∈ Ap. In
this case, xpi is identified as the fraction of population p
using strategy i ∈ Ap. Furthermore, xp is a population state
(corresponding to the mixed strategy of player p), and x
refers to the overall population state. In population games
generated by (random) matching in normal form games we
can identify each population p with a player. We note that the
single-player reinforcement learning (typically referred to as
a “play against nature”) is equivalent to a single-population
matching. The evolution of population states in a population
game can be modelled using a switching rule called the
revision protocol, [15]. Formally, a revision protocol is a map
ρp : ∆p × Rnp → Rnp×np≥0 where ρpij ∈ R≥0 is referred to as
the conditional switch rate, proportional to the probability of
agents in population p playing pure strategy i that switch to
using strategy j. The flow of population share of agents under
a particular revision protocol is given by, [15],
x˙pi =
∑
j∈Ap
xpjρ
p
ji − xpi
∑
j∈Ap
ρpij , (MD)
which is referred as the mean dynamics. The first term of
(MD) represents the rate of inflow of agents adopting strategy
i and the second term represents the rate of outflow of agents
9abandoning it. We note that when ρpij = x
p
j (u
p
j − Z), where
Z ∈ R acts as a threshold constant that is less than any payoff
upj , ρ
p
ij is the so called “imitation of success” revision protocol
[15], which generates the replicator dynamics as (MD). It is
well known that the replicator dynamics converges in strictly
stable games, but cycles in (null) stable games. Next, we show
that the revision protocol2:
ρpij = γ
−1xpj (u
p
j − zpj ) (40)
where zpj is updated as in (EXP-D-RL), generates (38). Indeed,
using (MD), (40) and
∑
j∈Ap x
p
j = 1 yields:
x˙pi = γ
−1(
∑
j∈Apx
p
jx
p
i (u
p
i − zpi )− xpi
∑
j∈Apx
p
j (u
p
j − zpj ))
= γ−1(xpi (u
p
i −
∑
j∈Apx
p
ju
p
j )− xpi (zpi −
∑
j∈Apx
p
jz
p
j ))
which is (38). In light of the similarity of (40) with the
“imitation of success” revision protocol, we refer to (40) as
“imitation of exponentially-discounted success”. We note that
(38) takes on the form of (scaled) replicator dynamics [15]
with an extra replicator-like correction term that depends
on the excess score, which is precisely the “penalty-adjusted
replicator equation” with discount rate T = 1 [5]. Further-
more, (39) is simply the (scaled) replicator dynamics under
the influence of a relative-entropy term that is independent of
the game payoff rate. We note that if the score is a direct
integration of the payoff, i.e., z˙pj = u
p
j , then we recover
the replicator dynamics obtained by [7] under exponential
learning. It is the replicator-like correction term in (38) (in-
duced by discounted integration) that enables convergence in
merely stable games, not necessarily strict. This beneficial
property is due by the more sophisticated imitation protocol
(40) versus pure imitation. An interpretation of (40) can be
given as follows. When agents playing i see that agent playing
j has nonzero payoff, they switch to strategy j with a rate
proportional to the difference between this payoff and the
cumulative discounted payoff over time, multiplied by the
popularity strategy j. This means an agent is more likely to
switch to strategy j if the payoff upj keeps on getting better
over time. We also note that similar to this, one can show
that the induced dynamics of the higher-order reinforcement
learning scheme (H-EXP-D-RL) is generated via the revision
protocol,
ρpij = γ
−1xpj (u
p
j − vpaj − zpj ) (41)
where vpai = Kξ
p
i +Kx
p
i .
VII. EXAMPLES AND NUMERICAL SIMULATIONS
In this section, we discuss several examples: single-
population game (p = 1) (Example 1 and 2), two-player games
(Example 3, 4 and 5) and three-player games (Example 6 and
7). In addition some difficult games are discussed: modified
RPS game, [30]) (Example 8), and a modified asymmetric
Jordan game, [10], (Example 9). In all cases we compare the
performance of (14) versus that of (36) in games characterized
by their monotonicity property as given by Assumption 1(i) or
2Strictly speaking, the proposed revision protocol is well defined only when
zpj is less than u
p
j and u
p
j ≥ 0 for all j ∈ Ap. The proposed revision protocol
here only serves to provide a behavioural intuition to the induced dynamics.
(ii). We take K = 1, a = 1 and an arbitrary initial condition
z(0).
In the first two examples we consider single-player rein-
forcement learning, [35, p.26], typically referred to as a “play
against nature”. The canonical example is equivalent to a
single-population matching, [15], (p=1), where the identities
of the agents can be interchanged. Under this identification,
consider a large population of agents, each randomly matched
with an opponent to play a symmetric two-player game with
U(x) = Ax. Then (24), −(x − x′)>A(x − x′) ≥ 0, for all
x, x′ ∈ ∆, is equivalent to y>Ay = 12y>(A + A>)y ≤ 0,
for all y ∈ T∆, and Assumption 1 can be checked via the
eigenvalues of A+A>. Thus, Assumption 1(i) holds if A+A>
is negative semi-definite with respect to the tangent space T∆.
Moreover, 12y
>(A + A>)y ≤ 12λmax(A + A>)‖y‖2, for all
y ∈ T∆, where λmax(A + A>) is the maximum eigenvalue
corresponding to an eigenvector in T∆. Thus, Assumption 1(ii)
holds with µ = 12λmax(A+ A
>).
Example 1. Single-population Rock-Paper-Scissors Game
Consider a large population of agents, each randomly
matched with an opponent to play the Rock-Paper-Scissors
(RPS) game characterized by the payoff matrix, [15],
A =
 0 −l 11 0 −l
−l 1 0
 , (42)
where l is a parameter. For l = 1 this known as a standard
RPS game (null stable, cf. [15, p. 79]). For l < 1 the game
is strictly stable, while for l > 1 it unstable (or bad RPS, cf.
[15]). This game has a unique, interior Nash equilibrium x?
which coincides with the Nash distribution (logit equilibrium)
x? =
[
1
3
1
3
1
3
]>
, and for which z? = 1−l3 1. The eigen-
values of A + A> are {2(1 − l), l − 1, l − 1} with the last
two corresponding to eigenvectors in T∆. Thus for l ≤ 1,
A + A> is negative semi-definite with respect to the tangent
space T∆ and satisfies Assumption 1(i). Note that for all
x ∈ ∆, (x−x′)>A(x−x′) = 1
2
(x−x′)>(A+A>)(x−x′) =
l − 1
2
‖x − x′‖22. Thus, Assumption 1(i) is satisfied for l = 1
and l ≤ 1 ((null) stable game) , while for l > 1 (unstable
game), Assumption 1(ii) holds with µ = l−12 . By Theorem 1
and Theorem 2, if l ≤ 1, (14) and (36) are guaranteed to
converge for any  > 0, while if l > 1, convergence is
guaranteed for any  > l−12 . We note that this lower bound is
not tight, and in fact in simulations we see that convergence
occurs even when it is violated. We show simulation results
for the Rock-Paper-Scissors game with l = 1, 2.5, 5 and 8 in
Figure 3, Figure 4, Figure 5 and Figure 6, respectively, all
for  = 1. Each figure shows the score trajectories and the
induced strategy trajectories in single-population, where the
blue line corresponds to trajectory of (14), while the red line
corresponds to trajectory of (36). For l = 1, 2.5, 5 the score
trajectories z(t) of both (14) (blue) and (36) (red) converge
to the corresponding z?, 0,− 121,− 431, respectively, while
the induced mixed-strategy x(t) trajectories converge to x?,
with the second-order converging faster than the first-order
dynamics. For l = 8, (36) converges, whereas (14) forms
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a limit cycle in the interior of the simplex. Computing the
Jacobian matrix of the dynamics (14) at z? reveals that the
eigenvalues are at {−1, l−1−66 ±
√
3(1+l)
6 i}, so a bifurcation
occurs at  = l−16 , which for l = 8 is
7
6 . For the Jacobian
matrix of the dynamics (36), a value of  close to where the
bifurcation occurs for l = 8 is 0.86 (computed numerically).
This explains why, in the RPS game with l = 8, for  = 1,
(36) converges, whereas (14) does not. This example shows
that the higher-order dynamics (36) can potentially solve larger
classes of games (“more unstable”).
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Fig. 3: Standard RPS game, l = 1,  = 1
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Fig. 4: Unstable RPS game, l = 2.5,  = 1
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Fig. 5: Unstable RPS game, l = 5,  = 1
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Fig. 6: Unstable RPS game, l = 8,  = 1
Example 2. 123-Anti-Coordination Game
Consider a population game in the class of concave potential
games where the payoff vector U(x) can be expressed as the
gradient of a C1, concave potential function, as in [15], [6].
It is well-known that this class of potential games satisfies
the monotonicity property in Assumption 1(i). Therefore by
Theorem 1 and Theorem 2, the induced mixed strategy tra-
jectories (14) and (36) are guaranteed to converge. Consider a
well-known case of the 123 anti-coordination game [15], with
A =
−1 0 00 −2 0
0 0 −3
 . (43)
The unique interior Nash equilibrium is located at x? =
[ 611 ;
3
11 ;
2
11 ]. The Nash distribution (logit equilibrium) corre-
sponding to  = 1 is x? = [0.40; 0.32; 0.27] and it does not
coincide with the Nash equilibrium. The simulation results are
shown in Figure 7(a), with the Nash equilibrium x? shown as
? in red. The induced mixed strategy trajectories of both (14)
(shown in blue) and (36) (in red) converge to x?. For small ,
x? gets arbitrarily close to x? (e.g., Figure 7(b) for  = 0.1).
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Fig. 7: 123 Anti-Coordination Game
In the following three examples we consider two-player
(asymmetric) games. We use the convention in [3], [14], where
player 1 is the “row” player with payoff matrix A and player 2
is the “column” player with payoff matrix B, so that U1(x) =
(x1)>Ax2, U2(x) = (x1)>Bx2. Then, U1(x) = (x1)>U1(x),
U2(x) = (x2)>U2(x) where U1(x) = Ax2, U2(x) = B>x1.
With x = (x1, x2), in this case,
U(x) =
[
U1(x)
U2(x)
]
=
[
0 A
B> 0
] [
x1
x2
]
:= Φx,
Since U is linear, (24) can be checked based on Φ, hence on
the payoff matrices of the two players, A and B. Note that (24)
is equivalent to −(x− x′)>Φ(x− x′) ≥ 0, for all x, x′ ∈ ∆,
hence if and only if y>(Φ + Φ>)y ≤ 0 for all y ∈ T∆.
Thus Assumption 1(i) holds if Φ+Φ> is negative semidefinite
with respect to T∆. Similarly, Assumption 1(ii) holds for µ =
1
2λmax(Φ + Φ
>), where λmax is maximum eigenvalue with
respect to the tangent space T∆. Assumption 1(i) is met for
example in zero-sum games, where B = −A, since Φ = −Φ>
(skew-symmetric) and x>Φx = 0, for all x ∈ ∆.
Note that Φ + Φ> =
[
0 A+ B
A> + B> 0
]
, so that the
eigenvalues of Φ + Φ> are the square roots of the eigenvalues
of (A+B)(A+B)> (cf. Lemma 4.4 in [29]). This means that
Φ+Φ> has always positive and negative eigenvalues, hence all
two-player games that satisfy Assumption 1(i) are null stable
(null monotone).
Example 3. Two-player Matching Pennies (MP) Game
In this game, player 1 and 2 flip a coin and reveal them
simultaneously. If the coins of the two players both land on
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head (or tail), then player 1 earns a payoff +1 from player
2, otherwise, player 2 earns a payoff +1 from player 1. The
payoff matrices are given by,
A =
[
+1 −1
−1 +1
]
, B = −A. (44)
so this is a zero-sum game. The unique interior Nash equilib-
rium is given by x? =
[
1
2
1
2
]>
, and coincides with the logit
equilibrium x?. The payoff vector is given by,
U(x) =
[
U1(x)
U2(x)
]
=
[
0 A
B> 0
] [
x1
x2
]
=
[
Ax2
−A>x1
]
:= Φx.
(45)
Since Φ+ΦT =0, Assumption 1(i) is satisfied. By Theorem 1
and Theorem 2, for l = 1, both first, (14), and higher-order,
(36) learning dynamics, are guaranteed to converge for any
 > 0. Simulations results are shown in Figure 8 and Figure 9
for  = 1 and γ = 1, and γ = 4, respectively. The dotted line
represents the induced strategy trajectories of (14), whereas
the solid line represents the induced strategy trajectories of
(36). It can be seen from the simulation that all the mixed
strategy trajectories converge to the Nash equilibrium and that
a higher learning rate γ increases the convergence speed.
2 Effect of γ in selected games
2.1 Two-player standard MP game
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Figure 40: Two-player mp game, γ = 1/4
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Figure 41: Two-player mp game, γ = 1/3
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Figure 42: Two-player mp game, γ = 1/2
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Figure 43: Two-player mp game, γ = 1
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Figure 44: Two-player mp game, γ = 2
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Fig. 8: Two-player Matching Pennies Game, γ = 1
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Fig. 9: Two-player Matching Penni s Game, γ = 4
Example 4. Two-player Rock-Paper-Scissors Game
Consider the two-player RPS game with payoff matrices
A and B, where A is as in (42) and B = A>. The unique
Nash distribution (same as the Nash equilibrium x?) is x? =
(x?1, x?2) where x?1=x?2=( 13 ,
1
3 ,
1
3 ). The payoff vector is
U(x) =
[
U1(x)
U2(x)
]
=
[
0 A
B> 0
] [
x1
x2
]
=
[
Ax2
Ax1
]
:= Φx,
where A is as in (42). The eigenvalues of A+B = A+ A> are
{2(l− 1), 1− l, 1− l} (see Example 1). Then, the eigenvalues
of Φ + Φ> are {±2(l − 1),±(1 − l),±(1 − l)}. For l = 1,
Assumption 1(i) holds; this is the zero-sum game considered
in [3]. On the other hand, for l 6= 1 the game satisfies
Assumption 1(ii) for µ = 12 |l− 1|. Thus, in this case even for
l < 1 the game is unstable. By Theorem 1 and Theorem 2,
for l = 1, both first, (14), and higher-order, (36) learning
dynamics, are guaranteed to converge for any  > 0, while for
l 6= 1, they are guaranteed to globally converge for  > 12 |l−1|.
As in Example 1, the bound on  is not tight. Figure 10
shows the induced strategy trajectories of the two players
under (14) (dotted line) and (36) (solid line), for  = 1, in the
standard RPS game (l = 1) and unstable RPS game (l = 5),
respectively, indicating convergence to x? = x?.
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(b) Two-player unstable RPS, l = 5
Fig. 10: Two-player standard and unstable RPS game,  = 1
We study the critical value of  for which bifurcation occurs
by computing the eigenvalues of the Jacobian of (14) and (36)
at equilibrium. For l = 5 the critical  value for bifurcation
for the first-order dynamics (14) is ∗ = 23 , while numerically
for (36) is ∗ = 0.347, with stable dynamics for  > ∗. In
Figure 11 we show the error plots from equilibrium for  = 0.5
for both learning dynamics. It can be seen that the higher-order
dynamics (36) converges, while (14) cycles, confirming the
conclusion that for the same  the higher-order dynamics can
converge in a larger class of games (more hypo-monotone).
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Fig. 11: Two-player unstable RPS game, l = 5,  = 0.5
Example 5. Two-player Shapley Game
Consider the Two-player Shapley game discussed in [3].
The payoff matrices of this game are given by,
A =
0 1 00 0 1
1 0 0
 B = A>. (46)
and this is as l = 0 in the RPS game (Example 4), so µ =
1
2 , an unstable game. In Fig. 12(a) and (b) we compare the
strategy trajectories for player 1 under (14) with  = 0.1, in
the standard RPS game (l = 1) (a) and in the Shapley game
(l = 0) (b), respectively. We note that in the Shapley game a
cycle is formed corresponding to Shapley triangle as in [3].
However, by Theorem 1 and Theorem 2, both learning
dynamics are guaranteed to converge for  > 12 . In Figure 13
we show strategy trajectories under (14) and (36) for  = 1;
it can be seen that both (14) (dotted line) and (36) (solid line)
converge. Unlike [3], there is no need for player-dependent
learning rates that satisfy a singular perturbation specific
relationship, (cf. PDRL in Proposition 5.4, [3]).
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Fig. 12: Two-player standard RPS and Shapley game,  = 0.1
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Fig. 13: Two-player Shapley game,  = 1
Example 6. Three-Player Network Zero-Sum Game
Consider a network represented by a finite, fully connected,
undirected graph G = (N , E) where N is the set of vertices
(players) and E ⊂ N × N is the set of edges. Given two
vertices (players) p, q ∈ N , we assume that there is a zero-
sum game on the edge (p, q) given by the payoff matrices
(Ap,q,Aq,p), whereby Aq,p = −Ap,q . Assume that N = 3
players are arranged in network G as shown in Figure 14 and
the payoff matrix is that of a Matching Pennies (MP) game,
A(k) =
[
+k −k
−k +k
]
. (47)
with the Nash equilibrium at
[
1
2
1
2
]>
.
3
1 2
Fig. 14: Three-Player Network Zero-Sum Game
Let the payoff matrices for each edge be given as,
A1,2 = A(1) A1,3 = A(2) A2,3 = A(3)
A2,1 = −A1,2 A3,1 = −A1,3 A3,2 = −A2,3
Since each pair-wise interaction between players is a zero-sum
game, the payoff vector of the overall player set is given by
U(x) =
U1(x)U2(x)
U3(x)
 =
 0 A
1,2 A1,3
−A1,2> 0 A2,3
−A1,3> −A2,3> 0

x1x2
x3
 .
Thus U(x) = Φx, where Φ + ΦT = 0, so that this game is
a null monotone game, cf. Assumption 1(i). Hence, by Theo-
rem 1 and Theorem 2, (14) and (36), respectively, converge for
any  > 0. Strategy trajectories of (14) (dotted line) and (36)
(solid line) are plotted in Figure 15, indicating convergence.
Example 7. Jordan Three-Player Matching Pennies Game
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Fig. 15: Three-Player Network MP game
The three-player Jordan game is a generalization of the Two-
Player Matching Pennies game [2, p. 22]. In this game, each
player flips a coin and reveals them simultaneously. Player 1
wins if the outcome matches that of player 2. Player 2 wins
if the outcome match that of player 3. Player 3 wins if the
outcome does not match that of player 1. Let player 1 be
the row player, and player 2 be the column one. The payoff
matrices can be represented as in Table 1. The unique Nash
Player 3 chooses H
H T
H +1,+1,−1 −1,−1,−1
T −1,+1,+1 +1,−1,+1
Player 3 chooses T
H T
H +1,−1,+1 −1,+1,+1
T −1,−1,−1 +1,+1,−1
TABLE 1: Payoff Matrices of Jordan MP game
equilibrium (and the Nash distribution/logit equilibrium) is at[
1
2
1
2
]>
for each player. Even though the payoff vector is no
longer linear, it can be shown that it satisfies Assumption 1(i).
The payoff vector for the player set can be written as
U(x) =

U11 (x)
U12 (x)
U21 (x)
U22 (x)
U31 (x)
U32 (x)
 =

x21x
3
1 − x22x31 + x21x32 − x22x32
−x21x31 + x22x31 − x21x32 + x22x32
x11x
3
1 + x
1
2x
3
1 − x11x32 − x12x32
−x11x31 − x12x31 + x11x32 + x12x32
−x11x21 + x12x21 − x11x22 + x12x22
x11x
2
1 − x12x21 + x11x22 − x12x22
 .
Note that U11 (x) = x
2
1(x
3
1+x
3
2)−x22(x31+x32) = x21−x22 =
[1 −1]x2, since x3 ∈ ∆3, x31+x32 = 1, and U12 (x) = −U11 (x).
Similarly, U21 (x) = (x
1
1 + x
1
2)x
3
1 − (x11 + x12)x32 = x31 − x32 =
[1 − 1]x3 and U22 (x) = −U21 (x). Also, U31 (x) = −x11(x21 +
x22) + x
1
2(x
2
1 + x
2
2) = −x11 + x12 = [−1 1]x1 and U32 (x) =
−U31 (x). Thus, with x = (x1, x2, x3),
U(x) =

0 0 1 −1 0 0
0 0 −1 1 0 0
0 0 0 0 1 −1
0 0 0 0 −1 1
−1 1 0 0 0 0
1 −1 0 0 0 0
x := Φx.
The eigenvalues of Φ + Φ> are {−4, 2, 2, 0, 0, 0}. Thus
µ = 1 and the learning dynamics are guaranteed to converge
for any  > 1 (cf. Theorem 1 and Theorem 2, under cf.
Assumption 1(ii)). Figure Figure 16 shows strategy trajectories
of all players under (14) (dotted line) and (36) (solid line),
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Fig. 16: Three-player Jordan MP game,  = 1
indicating convergence to the Nash equilibrium.
In order to study the behaviour of EXP-D-RL (14) and H-
D-EXP-RL(36) in some difficult games, in the following we
consider two modified RPS games (as in [30]), and a modified
asymmetric Jordan game (as in [10]).
Example 8. Modified RPS Game
Consider now two modified (generalized) RPS games
as in [30]). The first game has payoff matrix A = 0 −1 32 0 −1
−1 3 0
, with unique Nash equilibrium at x? =
(0.40625, 0.3125, 0.28125), while the other game has payoff
matrix A =
 0 −3 11 0 −2
−3 1 0
 (monocyclic), respectively, and
the Nash equilibrium is at x? = (0.28125, 0.3125, 0.40625).
The eigenvalues of A + AT are at {3.3723,−2.3723,−1},
while the eigenvalues of A+AT are at {−3.3723, 2.3723, 1},
with the −1 and +1 eigenvalues corresponding to an eigenvec-
tor in the tangent space. Thus the first modified RPS game A
is stable (monotone), while the second modified RPS game A
is unstable (hypo-monotone with µ = 0.5). By Theorem 1 and
Theorem 2, in the first RPS game A, the two dynamics, (14)
and (36), are guaranteed to converge to a Nash distribution
for any  > 0, while in the second RPS game A, the two
dynamics are guaranteed to converge to a Nash distribution
for any  > 0.5. In Fig. 17 and Fig. 18 we show simulations in
both games (side by side (a) and (b)), for  = 1 and  = 0.2, re-
spectively, with trajectories for (14) in blue and those for (36)
in red, respectively. It can be seen that for  = 1 in both games,
both dynamics converge to the corresponding Nash distribution
(logit equilibrium), which in either game does not coincide
with the Nash equilibrium (marked with ? in the plots). For
 = 1, in the first RPS game A, the Nash distribution is at
x? = (0.379, 0.2997, 0.3213), while for the second RPS game
A, the Nash distribution is at x? = (0.2741, 0.3647, 0.3612).
On the other hand for  = 0.2, in the first RPS game A, the
Nash distribution is x? = (0.4025, 0.3024, 0.2951) (very close
to the Nash equilibrium x?), and as seen in Fig. 18(a), both
dynamics converge to it. This cannot be said for the second
RPS game A for  = 0.2; as seen in Fig. 18(b), the first-
order dynamics (14) has a limit cycle, while the higher-order
dynamics (36) converges to the corresponding Nash distribu-
tion, which is x? = (0.2653, 0.3237, 0.4109) (very close to
the corresponding Nash equilibrium x?). This confirms our
previous observations regarding the better performance of the
higher-order dynamics (36). We note that for  = 0.1, in the
second RPS game A, both dynamics have a limit cycle.
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Fig. 17: Modified RPS game A and A, [30],  = 1
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Fig. 18: Modified RPS game A and A, [30],  = 0.2
Example 9. Modified Three-Player Jordan Game
Consider a three-player modified (asymmetric) Jordan
game as in [10], where U1(x) =
[
0 2
1 0
]
x2, U2(x) =[
0 1
1 0
]
x3, and U3(x) =
[
0 1/3
1 0
]
x1. The unique Nash
equilibrium is at ( 14 ,
3
4 ,
2
3 ,
1
3 ,
1
2 ,
1
2 ). In Fig. 19 we display the
strategy trajectory plots the three players for  = 0.1, which
show that the first-order dynamics (14) (dotted line) has a
limit cycle, while the higher-order dynamics (36) (solid line)
converges to the Nash distribution, close to Nash equilibrium.
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Fig. 19: Modified Three-player Jordan game,  = 0.1
VIII. CONCLUSION
This paper presents a passivity-based approach for analyz-
ing first-order exponentially-discounted reinforcement learn-
ing (EXP-D-RL) dynamics. We have shown convergence for
games characterized by their monotonicity property. We fur-
ther exploited passivity properties to propose a class of higher-
order schemes that preserve convergence properties, can im-
prove the speed of convergence and, as shown numerically, can
even converge in cases whereby their first-order counterpart
fail to converge. We demonstrated these properties through
numerical simulations for several representative games.
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